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INTRODUCTION
The Due Process Clause of the Constitution’s Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees to both parent and child due process of law.
Accordingly, when a child is involuntarily, albeit temporarily,
removed from the parent’s custody, the state must establish cause
for removal with the preponderance of the evidence, the lowest level
of proof to better accommodate the welfare of the child. If a parent’s
right to custody of his or her child is terminated, a final severance,
the evidence must be clear and convincing and based on state
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statutory standards, which are strictly construed. 1 In many cases,
removal is objectively warranted because of “severe child abuse,
and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to parent.” 2 At
other times, temporary removal or possible termination is based on
more subjective criteria, perhaps based on past parental
misconduct, arguably cured, but sufficient to anticipate that
logically, abuse or neglect may occur in the future. Removal or
termination based on subjective predictions factors is far less
objective, based upon conjecture of what may be termed imminent
abuse or predictive neglect, what may occur in the future. State
interference in the parent-child relationship occurs often in the
United States, adversely affecting fundamental rights.
Nonetheless, a portion of this interference, predicated upon
predictive neglect, is especially onerous because of its subjective
underpinning and the possibility that it unfairly imposes adverse
stereotypes on parents. However, predictive neglect is only one part
of a child welfare system that serviced 3,476,000 children
throughout the United States in 2019. 3
Courts describe predictive neglect as when “a parent has
committed severe and recurrent acts of abuse towards his [or her]
child, logic and life experiences dictate the presumption that an
unreformed parent will continue to be a threat to the welfare of the
child for the foreseeable future.” 4 While recurrent acts of abuse or
*Professor of Law Emeritus, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law; Visiting Professor of Law, The Georgetown University Law Center. The author is
grateful to Steve Young for his research assistance and to Sarah Manning for her
editorial assistance.
1 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (“For the natural parents,
however, the consequence of an erroneous termination is the unnecessary destruction of
their natural family.”). See also In re K.S.L., 538 S.W.3d 107, 116 (Tex. 2017)
(“Termination of parental rights is a grave decision, and a searching and painstaking
legal process is required . . . .”); In re Doe I, 463 P.3d 393, 403–04 (Idaho 2020) (Due
Process requires that proper formalities be met prior to termination of parental rights);
In re N.R.C., 94 S.W.3d 799, 811 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (termination is tantamount to a
civil death penalty); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (a parent’s right to raise
her child is one of the oldest fundamental liberty interests recognized by the United
States Supreme Court).
2 See, e.g., In re Caydan T., No. W2019-01436-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 1692300, at *1
(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2020).
3 CHILDREN’S
BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILD
MALTREATMENT 2019 ii (2021) [hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019].
4 J.L.G. v. Dent Cnty. Juv. Off., 399 S.W.3d 48, 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting In
re. T.M.E., 169 S.W.3d 581, 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)).
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neglect are objective, predictive neglect is conjecture, far from
certain. It invites questions as to how we determine that a parent
is “unreformed,” and then to conclude that similar abusive or
negligent acts will continue into the future. This consideration is
compounded by the fact that significant numbers of parents
adversely affected by predictive neglect often are victims of adverse
stereotypes, hence targets of discriminatory conjecture because of
race, physical or mental disability, poverty, poor living conditions,
or substance abuse. 5 Consistently, parents allege that “removal of
their children from their custody constituted discrimination against
them on the basis of their perceived disabilities.” 6 In spite of
statutory protections pertaining to race, 7 language proficiency, 8 or
gender identity, 9 populations most negatively affected by abuse and
neglect assertions are those historically vulnerable to stereotypes,
such as pregnant black women, LGBTQ parents, and parents with
language barriers. 10
When abuse or neglect allegations were made, children were
routinely removed from the custody of their parents and placed in
temporary placements while the parents were offered rehabilitative
services under a state’s parenting plan. Federal law required the
removal of the child from the custody of the parent before federal
funds were available to the state to pay for services, hence the
automatic removal of the child. As of 2018 and the passage of the
5 For a discussion of poverty and its impact on termination of parental rights, see
David Pimentel, Punishing Families for Being Poor: How Child Protection Interventions
Threaten the Right to Parent While Impoverished, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 885 (2019); H.
Elenore Wade, Note, Preserving the Families of Homeless and Housing-Insecure Parents,
86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 869 (2018); Joan M. Shaughnessy, An Essay on Poverty and Child
Neglect: New Interventions, 21 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 5, 11–12 (2014); Michele
Estrin Gilman, The Poverty Defense, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 495 (2013); Raymond C. O’Brien,
Reasonable Efforts and Parent-Child Reunification, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1029, 1049–
51 (2013); Janet L. Wallace & Lisa R. Pruitt, Judging Parents, Judging Place: Poverty,
Rurality, and Termination of Parental Rights, 77 MO. L. REV. 95 (2012).
6 In re Joseph W., Jr., 79 A.3d 155, 162 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2013).
7 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
8 See, e.g., S.Y. v. Superior Ct., 240 Cal. Rptr. 3d 137, 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
9 Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2076 (2017) (same-sex couples must be treated
equally as opposite-sex couples for benefits linked to marriage). See also Palomo v.
Bustamante, 2019 Guam 5, 10 (appellate court found no evidence in the trial court’s
decision that discrimination was made based on gender).
10 Caitlyn Garcia, Essay, Replacing Foster Care with Family Care: The Family First
Prevention Services Act of 2018, 53 FAM. L.Q. 27, 40–41, 46 (2019).

110

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 92:1

federal Family First Prevention Services Act (“Family First” or
“FFPSA”), children may remain with the parent or a family member
while the parents receive rehabilitative services. Commentators
suggest the Family First legislation “dramatically shifts the
national child welfare focus” by keeping children with their
families. 11 Nonetheless, the new legislation does not alter two
significant facts. First, adequate reasonable services must be
offered to the parent, and the parent must positively overcome the
adverse conditions within a specified period of time. Specifically, if
the child is in nonrelative foster care, the time specified is whenever
the child is apart from the parent for fifteen of the most recent
twenty-two months. 12 If the child remains with the parent or a
relative, any rehabilitative services may cease after twelve
months. 13 Second, the adequacy of reasonable services is elusive at
best since the cause of removal is persistent. What services are
adequate to address the major risk factors prompting the
involuntary removal of children from parents (domestic violence,
substance abuse, mental illness, poverty, and overall inability to
parent)?
This Article argues that the focus of child welfare should be
upon the adequacy of reasonable services provided to parents prior
to and after their child has been declared dependent because of an
abuse or neglect allegation. Admittedly, recent federal legislation
funding rehabilitation services while permitting a child to remain
with an offending parent may result in less trauma, but this feature
should not distract from the point that states must develop
adequate reasonable services, and these must be provided within a
specified period of time. The consequence of inadequate reasonable
services, unable to address adverse conduct within a specified time
frame, is the termination of parental rights. As such, remaining
with the parents while services are offered is a temporary respite.
The point is simple: to adequately address neglect, abuse, or
exploitation of children, both preventative and remedying services
11 Fabiola Villalpando, Family First Prevention Services Act: An Overhaul of
National Child Welfare Policies, 39 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 283, 283 (2019).
12 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103, 111 Stat. 2115,
2118 (1997) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1305) (requiring states to terminate
parental rights for children in nonrelative care for fifteen months).
13 Family First Prevention Services Act (Family First) of 2018, 42 U.S.C. §
671(e)(1)(A).
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must be made available earlier so that what is reasonable becomes
what is effective.

I. PARAMETERS OF CHILD ENDANGERMENT
A. Statistical Profile
Statistics reveal that during 2019, at least 656,000 children
throughout the United States were victims of abuse or neglect. 14
Classified according to race or culture, Native American children
have the highest rate of victimization, but African American
children have the second-highest rate. 15 Also, “[t]he rate of AfricanAmerican child fatalities is 2.3 times greater than the rate of White
children and 2.7 times greater than the rate of Hispanic children.” 16
Earlier statistics confirm continuing racial imbalance. In 2000,
“[m]ore than half of all victims were White (50.6%); a quarter
(24.7%) were African American; and a sixth (14.2%) were Hispanic.
American Indian/Alaska Natives accounted for 1.6 percent of
victims, and Asian-Pacific Islanders accounted for 1.4 percent of
victims.” 17 These numbers are significant considering the
proportion of the population each group represents.
The vast majority of cases involving child abuse and/or neglect,
resulting in the temporary removal of a child from a parent, include
domestic violence, drug and alcohol abuse, mental illness, or
poverty. 18 “Black children are more likely reported to child
protective agencies as victims of neglect, more likely to be
investigated, and subsequently more likely to be subject to
emergency removals.” 19 In addition, parents of color often exhibit
categories of “caregiver risk factors,” automatically generating an
See CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019, supra note 3, at xi.
Id. at 45 tbl.3-8.
16 Id. at xii.
17 CHILDREN’S
BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILD
MALTREATMENT 2000 4 (2002) [hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT 2000].
18 See generally A.J. SEDLAK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FOURTH
NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-4) (2010),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/opre/report/fourth-national-incidence-study-child-abuse-andneglect-nis-4-report-congress [https://perma.cc/2ADU-8QEF].
19 Tamara Louis-Jacques, Note, Don’t Call It a Comeback: The Promotion of
Rehabilitation and Reunification of Families Affected by Poverty-Related Neglect, 58
FAM. CT. REV. 1087, 1090–91 (2020).
14
15
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increase in the perception of child maltreatment in households of
color. Among these caregiver risk factors are alcohol abuse,
domestic violence, drug abuse, financial problems, inadequate
housing, public assistance, and physical or mental disabilities. 20
The largest percentage of neglect and abuse cases arise from homes
where there is domestic violence and drug use. Taken as a whole,
more than a quarter of all victims live with caretakers living on
public assistance. 21 Sadly, “children in their first year of life have
the highest rate of victimization at 24.8 per 1,000 children.” 22
Additional statistics further reveal the magnitude of the
problem of child welfare. Each day in the United States, child
protective services “removes approximately 750 children from their
homes.” 23 These are cases of actual removal, supposedly temporary.
The number of children who were the subject of a child protective
services investigation or alternative response during the 2019
federal fiscal year is far larger: a total of 3,476,000. 24 During this
same time period, 1,840 children died from abuse or neglect caused
by a parent. 25 Most allegations involve neglect (74.9%), followed by
physical abuse (17.5%), and then by sexual abuse (9.3%). 26 Included
within these statistics is, in addition to objectively verifiable abuse
and neglect, any act or failure to act, which presents an imminent
risk of serious harm, a more nebulous category precipitating
predictive neglect. 27 States routinely incorporate an “imminent risk
of serious harm” standard into practice. For example, when a
mother was mentally incapable of caring for an infant and the
father displayed no credible willingness to fully protect and care for
the child, the child was removed from the parents’ custody even

CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019, supra note 3, at 23.
Id. (“In 38 reporting states, 29.4 percent of victims have the drug abuse caregiver
risk factor and 28.8 percent of victims have the domestic violence caregiver factor.”).
22 COLO. DEP’T OF HUM. SERVS., COLORADO FAMILY FIRST PREVENTION PLAN 15
(2020) [hereinafter COLORADO FAMILY FIRST] (citing CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2016 19 (2018)).
23 Pimentel, supra note 5, at 887 (citing CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., NO. 24, THE AFCARS REPORT 1 (2017)).
24 CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019, supra note 3, at ii.
25 Id.
26 Id. at xi. See also MICHAEL T. FLANNERY & RAYMOND C. O’BRIEN, THE SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN 125–356 (2016).
27 CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019, supra note 3, at 16.
20
21
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though as yet there was no harm done. 28 State statutes provide for
temporary removal whenever there is reasonable cause to believe
that the child suffers serious physical injury or, as statutes are
often prone to say, in “immediate physical danger” from his or her
surroundings. 29 Colorado, for example, defines “candidacy of
serious risk” as based on “circumstances and characteristics of the
family as a whole and/or circumstances and characteristics of
individual parents or children that may affect the parents’ ability
to safely care for and nurture their children.” 30
Predictive neglect is considered a form of child
endangerment. 31 Inadequate child supervision—specifically
inattention to safety, disregard for nutrition, clothing, or personal
hygiene—is illustrative of child endangerment based on predictive
neglect. Children are often removed from their parents’ homes
because of suspicions that the child may come to harm in the
future. 32 Objective suspicions justifying foreseeable maltreatment
and immediate child removal are instantaneously verifiable, yet
few statistical studies verify the parameters of justifiable likely
recurrence or predictive neglect. One study monitored 1,181
families with a previously substantiated reported incident of
neglect or abuse of a child. 33 The study found that within five years
of the initial report, “42.6% had 1 or more new substantiated
reports, 20.4% had 2 or more, 9.8% had three or more, 4.8% had 4
28 See In re Joseph W., Jr., 79 A.3d at 222–23 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2013). See also In re
E.G., 726 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (parent’s absence was likely to cause serious
harm to the child in the future); D.A. v. Dep’t Child. & Fam. Servs., 84 So. 3d 1136 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (parent suffered from bipolar disorder and substance abuse
precipitating two recent admissions to a treatment facility creating possibility of future
harm to the child).
29 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-129b(b) (West 2020).
30 COLORADO FAMILY FIRST, supra note 22, at 8.
31 For a discussion of child endangerment in the context of clergy sexual abuse
allegations, see Raymond C. O’Brien, Church and State and Child Endangerment, 56
CRIM. L. BULL. 601 (2020).
32 See, e.g., Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. J.H., 425 P.3d 791 (Or. Ct. App. 2018) (mother’s
past drug use endangered child to risk of domestic violence between the mother and her
partner); New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. and Permanency v. M.C., 89 A.3d 225 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (father’s past conduct was sufficient to indicate that children’s
physical, mental, or emotional condition was in imminent danger).
33 Hyunil Kim & Brett Drake, Cumulative Prevalence of Onset and Recurrence of
Child Maltreatment Reports, 58 J. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1175,
1175 (2019).
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or more, and 1.8% had 5 or more.” 34 Another study from St. Louis,
Missouri followed 5,884 low-income children [and] found that by
age eighteen years, “58.7% had at least one, 39.7% had at least 2,
27% had at least 3, and 19.1% had at least 4 reports.” 35 Overall,
data suggests that “child maltreatment report recurrence is a
commonplace occurrence . . . It is further estimated that by age 12
years, 1 in 36 children will have at least 5 reports and 1 in 56
children will have at least 6 reports.” 36 While these reports confirm
plausible recurrence, they neglect to report on the level of services
offered to parents found to be endangering their children. The level
of services, what is offered, and what it utilized is the lynchpin of
child protection prior to the 2018 enactment of Family First and
remains the cornerstone thereafter.
Once a child is deemed endangered, until very recently, the
practice was to remove the child from the custody of the offending
parent or parents and place the child into foster care or, if none was
available, into a group home setting. Indeed, removal from the
parent’s home was emblematic of dependency procedures until very
recently. States could only receive federal reimbursement for child
care expenses if the child was placed in an out-of-home foster care
placement, and payments range between 50 to 83% of the cost of
foster care payments. 37 As a result, states were incentivized to
remove children and assign them to foster care or group homes.
Under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, federal and state
governments share costs to care for maltreated children outside of
the home, albeit foster care or group placements, with states
providing one dollar for every three dollars they receive from the
federal government. 38 Federal funding for child welfare relied upon
the states to decide who qualified, but if approved, the child was
34 Id. (citing Diane DePanfilis & Susan J. Zuravin, Epidemiology of Child
Maltreatment Recurrence, 73 SOC. SERV. REV. 218, 221–37 (1999)).
35 Id. (citing Melissa Jonson-Reid, Patricia L. Kohl & Brett Drake, Child and Adult
Outcomes of Chronic Child Maltreatment, 129 PEDIATRICS 839 (2012)).
36 Kim & Drake, supra note 33, at 1181.
37 Not all children are eligible for foster care payments because of the Title IV-E
lookback requirement that links eligibility to the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, a child welfare program that ended in 1996. See Rosie Frihart-Lusby, Note,
Unconstitutional or Just Bad Policy?: Title IV-E’s AFDC “Lookback” and the
Constitutional Guarantee of Equal Protection, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1069, 1080 n.78 (2020).
38 EMILIE STOLTZFUS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF 10590, CHILD WELFARE: PURPOSES,
FEDERAL PROGRAMS, AND FUNDING 2 (2019).

2022]

CHILD WELFARE REMEDIAL SERVICES

115

provided with a safe and stable environment until a permanent
placement became available. 39 Because the child was safe and most
of the cost was borne by federal grants, children and parents were
forcibly separated and children placed in foster care, often for years,
while the state, in many cases, offered the parents inadequate
remedial services while simultaneously planning on terminating
parental rights.
Time limits imposed by the Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997 curtailed many instances of indefinite stays in foster care. 40
Likewise, states imposed time limits on services, California
imposing a twelve-month limit on most services. 41 Overall, the child
deserves permanency, so if the parent cannot reasonably rectify the
adverse conduct in the foreseeable future, parental rights need to
be terminated to accommodate the child’s needs. The child has Due
Process rights too. 42 To provide a modicum of protection to the child,
the court must decide if the “child would be harmed by a continued
relationship with the parent” within a reasonable amount of time. 43
The adequacy of remedial services provided during this time is the
lynchpin.

B. Federal Legislation
1. Title IV-E of the Social Security Act
“Since [fiscal year] 2012, the number of children in [foster] care
on the last day of each fiscal year through [fiscal year] 2017 have
39 See, e.g., Child Abuse Prevention, Adoption, and Family Services Act of 1988
(CAPAFSA), Pub. L. No. 100-294, § 102 Stat. 102 (1988); Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978, Title II of CAPAFSA, Pub. L. No. 100-294,
§201-02, 102 Stat. 102, 122-24 (1988); Promoting Safe and Stable Families Amendments
of 2001, 42 U.S.C. 1305; Title XX of the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-647.
40 See, e.g., State ex rel. Child., Youth & Fams. Dep’t v. Jalexus S., No. A-1-CA-37966,
2020 WL 3970209 (N.M. Ct. App. July 9, 2020). For a description of the Adoption and
Safe Families Act, see Elizabeth O’Connor Tomlinson, Termination of Parental Rights
Under Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), 115 AM. JUR. TRIALS 465 (2021).
41 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(a)(1) (West 2021).
42 See Raymond C. O’Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Children
Versus Parents, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1209, 1247–56 (1994).
43 In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Mo. 2004) (certain conduct, such as rape,
abandonment, incest, or murder, do not require inquiry about future harm to the child,
termination is immediately warranted). See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447.2(3) (West
2018) (murder); Id. at 5(4) (rape); Id. at 11 (rape); Id. at 5(2)(c) (incest); Id. at 2(2)
(abandonment).
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increased.” 44 In 2018, there were 435,000 children in foster care,
but that number dropped slightly in 2019 to 424,000. 45 The vast
majority of affected children are placed in nonrelative foster family
homes, approximately 195,000 in 2017; another 140,000 were
placed in relative (kinship) foster homes; another 25,000 were
placed in group homes. 46 Racial characteristics of children in foster
care are illustrative of the inordinate number of children of color in
out-of-home placements, including foster care and group homes. In
2019, 23% of all children in foster care were Black or African
American, 2% were American Indian or Alaska Native, and 21%
were Hispanic. 47 More than half of all children in foster care were
eventually reunified with parents, relatives, or a primary caregiver,
but 20% remained in foster care placements for more than thirty
months, some for more than five years. 48
The provisions in Title IV-E of the Social Security Act enacted
by Congress are partially to blame for the large number of children
in out-of-home foster care placements. Title IV-E provides states
with unlimited financial reimbursement for approved services,
which includes foster care. 49 Thus, a state could receive unlimited
reimbursement for approved services that provided a child with a
safe environment until the cause for removal was rectified, or a
permanent home was found. As a result, children could linger in
foster care for lengthy periods of their lives while the state provided
mediocre remedial services to the parents to correct the cause of
abuse or neglect. 50
To address the staggering number of children in out-of-home
foster care placements, Congress enacted the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”), which limited the amount of time a
child could remain in foster care while waiting for a parent to
44 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION: FY
2010-FY 2019, 2 (2020).
45 Id.
46 Villalpando, supra note 11, at 283.
47 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NO. 27, THE AFCARS
REPORT 2 (2020).
48 Id. at 3.
49 CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42792, CHILD WELFARE: A DETAILED OVERVIEW OF
PROGRAM ELIGIBILITY AND FUNDING FOR FOSTER CARE, ADOPTION ASSISTANCE AND
KINSHIP GUARDIANSHIP ASSISTANCE UNDER TITLE IV-E OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 9
(2012).
50 See Garcia, supra note 10, at 30–31.
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comply with state parenting plans. 51 The 1997 legislation put
pressure on the states, requiring them to choose qualified relative
(kinship) foster homes, rather than nonrelative homes. For parents
with children in nonrelative care, states were required to provide
them with reasonable remedial services to reunify the family or
satisfy conditions for termination of parental rights. If the parents
did not cooperate sufficiently with these services within a specific
period, their rights were terminated. Like the Family First
legislation, adequate state-sponsored services—preventative and
remedial—are crucial for parents seeking to retain custody.
Because of ASFA, they are now faced with a time limit. If a child
remains in nonrelative foster care for fifteen out of the most recent
twenty-two months, the state may petition to terminate parental
rights as long as the state can document its efforts to promote
reunification through reasonable efforts. 52 The inadequacy of
efforts due to a state’s “limited resources” 53 falls far harder on the
parents than on the state. If the state fails to provide services
adequate to justify terminating the parent’s rights, the child
remains in foster care, mostly subsidized by the federal
government. If the state can meet its burden of adequate services,
the parent’s right to the child is terminated. In either case, the child
is separated from the parent. For a parent, often victimized by
discriminatory profiling, 54 the state’s failure to provide adequate
services continues parent-child separation and may eventually
precipitate termination of parental rights.

51 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101, 111
Stat. 2115, 2116 (1997) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1305). The Family First
Prevention Services Act eliminates the fifteen months in foster home care limitation,
replacing it with a services limitation. See Family First Prevention Services Act, Pub. L.
No. 115-123, § 50721(a), 132 Stat. 245 (2018).
52 See Jeanne M. Kaiser, Finding a Reasonable Way to Enforce the Reasonable
Efforts Requirement in Child Protection Cases, 7 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 100, 108–
09 (2009).
53 Villalpando, supra note 11, at 283.
54 See, e.g., In re Adoption of C.M., 414 S.W.3d 622, 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013)
(“Mother’s prior incarceration was not, in and of itself, a ground for termination of
parental rights. Similarly, the fact Mother entered the U.S. illegally, is not well
educated, and speaks Spanish as her primary language, cannot be grounds for
termination.”)
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2. Family First Prevention Services Act
A new element was introduced in 2018 when Congress enacted
the Family First legislation, 55 changing Title IV-E of the Social
Security Act to provide for the following:
First, reimbursements. Federal reimbursement payments
may be made to a state to provide services to families at “imminent
risk” of having their children removed to foster care. 56 As a result,
family in-home services are now available to families under Family
First, whereas previously, these services could only be obtained if
the child was removed from the custody of the parent. However,
perhaps these services are not so unique. Data reveals that
1,332,254 children already received in-home services during fiscal
year (“FY”) 2017. 57 Nonrelative foster care is increasingly difficult
to find because of the dwindling number of approved nonrelative
foster parents. Also, group homes or congregate-care facilities are
specifically excluded from Family First funding after two weeks,
with limited exceptions. 58 Their exclusion, replaced with a
“qualified residential treatment program,” limits placement in
group homes to no longer than two weeks, which will effectively
eliminate groups homes that serve special needs youth. Among
these are youth with severe behavioral challenges and youth
involved in the juvenile justice system for whom group homes are
less restrictive than locked detention centers. 59 This is a loss.
55 Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-123 (2018). For a summary of the Act
and its individual components, see Children’s Defense Fund, Implementing the Family
First Prevention Services Act: A Technical Guide for Agencies, Policymakers, and Other
Stakeholders
(Feb.
18,
2020),
https://www.childrensdefense.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/FFPSA-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5XY-U6D7].
56 Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-123, §§ 50711 (e)(4)(A)(i), (13), 132
Stat. 232, 233 (2018).
57 Family First Act: A False Narrative, A Lack of Review, A Bad Law, CHILD
WELFARE MONITOR (Oct. 1, 2019), https://childwelfaremonitor.org/2019/10/01/familyfirst-act-a-false-narrative-a-lack-of-review-a-bad-law [https://perma.cc/79QK-GEUB].
58 See Therapeutic Group Homes: Needed Programs in Danger from Family First Act,
CHILD
WELFARE
MONITOR
(Mar.
4,
2019),
https://childwelfaremonitor.org/2019/03/04/therapeutic-group-homes-needed-programsin-danger-from-family-first-act/ [https://perma.cc/V6G2-J7AE].
59 See, e.g., Sean Hughes, The Family First Prevention Services Act: A Mixed Bag of
Reform, THE IMPRINT, (June 22, 2016, 3:00 AM), (citing the Transitional Housing
Placement Program in California as an example of one group home that would lose
funding because of the new legislation), https://imprintnews.org/analysis/family-firstprevention-services-act-mixed-bag-reform/19073 [https://perma.cc/PS23-S6SX].
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While permitting the child to remain in the family home, thus
avoiding the trauma of parent-child separation, states only qualify
for services once the families have reached an imminent risk level
of crisis justifying the removal of the child, which some argue fails
to intervene early enough to qualify as sufficiently preventive. 60
Funding under Family First may pose a danger to children forced
to find shelter in nonrelative foster homes because nonrelative
foster care requires a qualifying look-back period that may
disqualify certain parents. Because Family First funds do not have
this look back requirement, children who are disqualified may be
kept in dangerous homes so as to qualify for federal
reimbursements. 61
Federal funding may also be available if, instead of the family
home, the child is placed with relatives, often described as kinship
care. 62 It is assumed that living with a relative will be less
traumatic for a child, but there is concern that in an effort to qualify
for Family First funds, states may utilize non-licensed, nonsupervised relatives, which could pose additional risk to children. 63
However, states may have few affordable options and lack of overall
funding prompts another complaint about Family First. That is,
“the bill was designed to be cost-neutral,” and hence no effort is
made to make additional funds available for child welfare. 64 To
soften the blow for states forced to comply with Family First,
Congress enacted the Family First Transition and Support Act in
2019 65 to ease the transition, but the leeway provided is shortlived. 66
Id.
Id. See also Frihart-Lusby, supra note 37, at 1094.
62 For a description of the interconnection between the Kinship Navigator Program
and
Family
First,
see
Kinship
Navigator
Programs,
GRANDFAMILIES,
http://www.grandfamilies.org/Resources/Kinship-Navigator-Programs
[https://perma.cc/XB7T-RM8D] (last visited Aug. 1, 2021).
63 See, e.g., Family First Act, supra note 57 (citing Will the New Foster Care Law Give
Grandparents a Hand?, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (June 5, 2018),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/06/05/willthe-new-foster-care-law-give-grandparents-a-hand [https://perma.cc/RQR2-9CW3]).
64 Hughes, supra note 59.
65 Promoting Safe and Stable Families Program, 42 U.S.C. § 629 (2018). The statute,
renamed to honor the memory of MaryLee Allen, is now called the MaryLee Allen
Promoting Safe and Stable Families Program.
66 See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-123, § 50711, 132 Stat. 64, 232
(2018).
60
61
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Starting in 2027, federal contributions will be made through
the state’s Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (“FMAP”)
programs. 67 However, even today, state Medicaid expenditures
cover many mental health and substance abuse programs currently
being provided. In addition to Medicaid, there are additional
funding sources such as Title IV-B, TANF, Social Services Block
Grants, and CAPTA funds. 68 An added benefit is that Medicaid
programs do not count towards 50% of programs that must be wellsupported to receive Family First funding. 69
Second, parenting plans. Services provided under the state’s
parenting plan must be trauma-informed, meet certain evidencebased requirements, and be intended to address risk factors such
as domestic violence, unsafe home conditions, substance abuse
disorder, mental health care, and in-home parenting skills. 70
Family First does not list specific criteria for the plans but, at a
minimum, the plans must specify why the placement was chosen,
the measures taken to address the cause for removal, and a strategy
for permanent child placement. A significant feature is that states
are not obligated to find alternative permanent homes concurrently
while the parents receive services under the parenting plan.
Indeed, Family First halted federal adoption assistance for any
67
68

233.

Id.
For further discussion of these programs, see infra text accompanying notes 192-

69 Family First Act, supra note 57. The 50% requirement was suspended temporarily
under the Family First Transition Act 2020. Id.
70 See Implementing the Family First Prevention Services Act: A Technical Guide for
Agencies, Policymakers, and Other Stakeholders, CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND 20 (Feb.
18,
2020),
https://www.childrensdefense.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/FFPSAGuide.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4MS-8C2G], for listing criteria of what is evidence based:

● Book or Manual: The practice has a book, manual or other available writings
that specify the components of the practice protocol and describe how to
administer the practice. ● No Empirical Risk of Harm: There is no empirical
basis suggesting that, compared to its likely benefits, the practice constitutes
a risk of harm to those receiving it. Weight of Evidence Supports Benefits: If
multiple outcome studies have been conducted, the overall weight of the
evidence supports the benefits of the practice. ● Reliable and Valid Outcome
Measures: Outcome measures are reliable and valid and are administrated
consistently and accurately across all those receiving the practice. ● No Case
Data for Severe or Frequent Risk of Harm: There is no case data suggesting a
risk of harm that was probably caused by the treatment and that was severe
or frequent.
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child adopted prior to that child’s second birthday. 71 However,
states are obligated to submit a five-year evidence-based prevention
plan that includes monitoring the safety of children while services
are provided; adherence to the practice model is monitored to
indicate if projected outcomes are achieved. 72 Eventually, starting
in October 2021, to meet federal funding requirements of 50%,
programs must meet strict standards of “well-supported,” but
currently there are very few programs meeting these criteria, 73
hence the 2019 legislation to delay the 50% requirement.
Third, time limits. There is a twelve-month limit on federal
reimbursement for services. The program instructions clarify,
though, that if children and families need services beyond twelve
months and the need for additional services is documented in their
parenting plan, they may receive continuing months of services. If
a child returns home from a foster care placement, the child has
access to a fifteen-month period of family reunification services. 74
These time limitations, coupled with what may be inadequate
services, are barriers for parents with, for example, serious opioid
addiction. The “high recidivist rate of opioid addiction, at 70%,
renders the FFPSA’s time limitation of twelve months of services
grossly inadequate.” 75 Yet, Family First is lauded as a significant
modification to the Title IV-E program because it authorized openended matching funds to help pay for selected evidence-based
mental health, substance abuse, in-home-parenting, and kinship
navigator programs. 76

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-123, § 50781, 132 Stat. 64, 268 (2018).
Family First Prevention Services Act Fiscal Analysis: Guide and Tools, ANNIE E.
CASEY FOUNDATION 8–9 (June 20, 2020), https://assets.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecffamilyfirstfiscalanalysis-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/S635-LSEZ]. See, e.g., COLORADO
FAMILY FIRST., supra note 22, at 25–30 (describing its evaluation process).
73 See
Title
IV-E
Prevention
Services:
Clearing
House,
https://preventionservices.abtsites.com/program?combine_1=&prograting%5B1%5D=1
[https://perma.cc/4U6W-7DEM] (last visited Aug. 1, 2021). “Well-supported” means that
at least two target outcomes in studies with separate samples in usual care settings
demonstrate positive effects and at least one of these effects is maintained for twelve
months after treatment ends.
74 Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-123, § 50721, 132 Stat. 64, 245 (2018).
75 Garcia, supra note 10, at 38.
76 ELLIOT GRAHAM, TITLE IV-E WAIVER DEMONSTRATIONS: HISTORY, FINDING, AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILD WELFARE POLICY AND PRACTICE 3 (2021).
71
72
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When Family First became operative, few states submitted
five-year prevention programs. 77 Those that did laud the
opportunity to keep children in their homes and avoid foster care
placement. They also welcomed freedom from income-eligibility
standards associated with Title IV-E foster care placements.
However, they did not like the fact that state funds needed to be
appropriated for: (1) evaluating current state services, (2) assessing
the outcomes of these services, (3) increasing salaries for social
service workers to counter their very high turnover rate, (4)
upgrading outdated case management systems and training
curriculum, and (5) implementing standards of evidence
corresponding with federal standards. 78 To illustrate state
concerns, Virginia’s budget for 2021 included $125,977,900 in state
funds and $143,524,447 from federal funds to support state child
welfare efforts in the state. 79 This illustrates the significant state
contribution.
To soften the blow, in December 2019, Congress passed the
Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020, 80 which includes
the Family First Transition Act meant to support states and tribes
as they seek to implement Family First. Specifically, the Transition
Act temporarily: (1) suspends the evidence-based requirements for
prevention programs, (2) suspends the requirement that 50% of
program expenditures must be for the highest evidence tier of
programs (well-supported), (3) provides an additional $2.75 million
to support Title IV-E Prevention Services Clearinghouse to review
and rate evidence-based programs, (4) grants $20 million in grants
to develop kinship navigator programs, (5) provides $500 million to
77 As of June 7, 2021, the following states or cities submitted plans subsequently
approved: Arkansas, District of Columbia, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. Additional states have
submitted plans seeking approval: Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine,
Missouri, Montana, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Status of Submitted
Title IV-E Prevention Program Five-Year Plans, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATION
FOR
CHILDREN
&
FAMILIES
(Feb.
18,
2020),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/data/status-submitted-title-iv-e-prevention-program-fiveyear-plans [https://perma.cc/N9K3-TL9T].
78 Valerie L’Herrou, Cassie Cunningham & Salaam Bhatti, Unallot a Lot: Virginia’s
Human Services Budgeting in the Time of Coronavirus, 24 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 149,
160–61 (2021).
79 Id. at 163.
80 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020, Pub. L. 116-94 (2020).
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support states as they update their infrastructure and initiate new
programs related to Family First, and (6) lessens any decrease in
funds to states participating in Title IV-E Waiver Demonstration
Projects. 81 Most of these benefits will expire at the end of 2021, but
during fiscal years 2022 and 2023, the 50% requirement applies to
both supported and well-supported programs, but then applies only
to well-supported programs in 2024.

II. AN ILLUSTRATION: PREDICTIVE NEGLECT
The inadequacy of remedial services disproportionately affects
poor parents, unmarried parents, parents never educated in
beneficial parenting skills, and parents often afflicted with
substance addiction and mental health issues prompting aggressive
behavior. Statistically, a disproportionate number of these parents
are Native American, African American, or Hispanic. Because
predictive neglect assessments involve consideration of future
conduct, the factual and legal contexts illustrate how adequate
remedial services are essential to the retention of parental rights
and also how conjecture may adversely impact parents of color.

A. The Factual Context
Child welfare and the risk factors that prompt neglect and
abuse should not be viewed only in the context of statutes and fiscal
year statistics. People are involved. These people reveal that each
day in the United States 1,683 babies are born into poverty, and
773 of these babies are born into extreme poverty. 82 Likewise, and
this fact must be repeatedly mentioned, one segment of the
population is disproportionately affected: families of color.
Furthermore, when children of color and their families become
involved in the child welfare system, they experience worse
outcomes than Caucasian children and their families, remaining in
81 Elizabeth Jordan & Amy McKlindon, The Family First Transition Act Provides
New Implementation Supports for States and Tribes, CHILD TRENDS (Mar. 10, 2020) (Act
renamed Title IV-B, Subpart 2 of the Social Security Act, the MaryLee Allen Promoting
Safe and Stable Families Program).
82 New Report: The State of America’s Children is Shameful, CHILDREN’S DEFENSE
FUND (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.childrensdefense.org/2020/new-report-the-state-ofamericas-children-is-shameful/ [https://perma.cc/ZGD4-6LN7].
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the system longer, with lower rates of permanency, and their
mental and physical health needs are poorly addressed. 83 Their
plight is particularly applicable to predictive neglect, whereby a
child is removed from the parent and then possibly terminated from
that parent’s custody because of anticipated future conduct. The
subjective analysis involved in predictive neglect illustrates the
perils of being poor, a family of color, and/or a victim of addiction or
worsening mental health.
To illustrate, one case involved “a poor woman, dealing with
domestic violence, who had trouble securing her own stable housing
and employment.” 84 The mother’s children were removed from her
custody and placed in a nonrelative foster home, where they lived
for more than two years as she worked with social services to rectify
her adverse home conditions. During these two years, the children
bonded with their foster parents and were thriving in a stable
home. Nonetheless, the mother consistently sought the return of
her twin children. The state petitioned the court to terminate the
mother’s parental rights, and at the termination hearing, the court
acknowledged “the long road ahead and the hardship nontermination could place on these two children in the future should
Mother and the children not receive therapeutic support to repair
the parent-child relationship.” 85 The mother admitted to neglecting
her children in the past, but facts revealed that after the children
were removed, she participated in state-sponsored services and
showed improvement in her behavior. The trial court granted the
state’s motion to terminate the mother’s rights in her children, but
on appeal, the appellate court noted the progress the mother made;
declared the legal necessity of finding clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence of a statutory ground for termination; and overturned the

83 Shanelle Dupree, The 2020 Department for Children and Families Series: Babies
in the River, 89 J. KAN. B.A. 22, 23 (2020) (citing Elisa Minoff, Entangled Roots: The Role
of Race in Policies that Separate Families, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY
(2018),
https://cssp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/CSSP-Entangled-Roots.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5ALK-BH86]).
84 In re J.L.D., 560 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018). See also In re C.J.G., 358
S.W.3d 549, 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (parent suffered from anger management, plus
alcohol and drug abuse); In re T.L.B., 376 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (mother failed
to cooperate with anger managements classes). Domestic violence appears in many of
the cases. See, e.g., In re D.D.C., 351 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).
85 In re J.L.D., 560 S.W.3d at 909.
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trial court’s order of termination. 86 The court concluded: “Though
the trial court’s findings regarding past abuse and neglect are
supported by substantial evidence, we find that the court failed to
make the necessary explicit findings regarding future harm.” 87
These facts illustrate the elements of predictive neglect
petitions. Specifically, any allegations of parental unfitness
justifying more than temporary involuntary removal of the child
from the parent must be supported by at least clear and convincing
evidence. Then, in conformity with a parenting plan proposed by
the state, rehabilitative services are offered to the parent, which
will gradually indicate whether future adverse parental conduct
can be corrected. 88 Another factor is that federal legislation
establishes time limits on a parent’s cooperation with the parenting
plan proposed by the state. 89 Yet, in all of these cases, sooner or
later a court will be tasked with deciding if there is a credible link
between the “parent’s past conduct and . . . predicted future
behavior and an explicit consideration of the likelihood of future
harm to the child based on those past acts.” 90 Requiring adequate
remedial services as part of the parenting plan provided to the
parent is the lynchpin upon which parental rights depend.
The 2018 Family First legislation allows states to permit the
child at imminent risk to remain with the parent or a relative and
avoid nonrelative foster care placement. 91 However, even if children
remain within the home while the parent complies with the
parenting plan, the issue for courts remains the same: whether a
parent’s past conduct can be remedied sufficiently to offset the
probability of future (predictive) adverse behavior. The test
depends upon a parent’s cooperation with adequate remedial
services. Qualifying as adequate is difficult because the parents and

Id.
Id. at 913 (emphasis added).
88 See, e.g., In re Z.V.A., 835 S.E.2d 425, 430 (N.C. 2019) (parental rights were
terminated when parents demonstrated that they were “not able to use any of the
learned skills to communicate or deal with each other in a more positive and effective
manner”).
89 In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Mo. 2004).
90 In re E.D.C., 499 S.W.3d 766, 770 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (citing In re C.K., 221 S.W.3d
467, 474 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)).
91 Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-123, § 50711, 132 Stat. 232-44 (2018)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671).
86
87
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children involved are disproportionately parents of color,
unmarried, poor, or a combination of all three. As a result, when
predicting what may occur in the future, there is the added element
of racial conjecture, profiling, intentional and unintentional
stereotyping, any of which heightens the risk of parent-child
custody removal and eventual termination of custody.
Subjectivity, conjecture, and speculation permeate the
determination of child welfare. Best interest of the child is “a
subjective assessment based on the totality of the circumstances.” 92
Whenever a petition to terminate parental rights is submitted to
any trial court, that court must make “a subjective assessment
based on the totality of the circumstances.” 93 Admittedly, in seeking
objectivity, the state may list statutory factors to consider—
Missouri lists seven—defining what constitutes the best interest of
the child. 94 Even then, “[t]here is no requirement, statutory or
otherwise, that all seven of these factors must be negated before
termination can take place; likewise, there is no minimum number
of negative factors necessary for termination.” 95 In short, even
though objectivity is desired in establishing a child’s best interest,
the process remains subjective and elusive when evaluating any list
of statutory factors.
To illustrate the elusiveness of best interest, the facts of In re
I.G.P. involved a boy who was one year old when he was removed
from the custody of his mother because of “lack of supervision and

92 In re M.T.E.H., 468 S.W.3d 383, 397 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (citing In re C.A.M., 282
S.W.3d 398, 409 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)).
93 In re L.J.D., 352 S.W.3d 658, 662 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).
94 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447.7 (West 2021) (“(1) The emotional ties to the
birth parent; (2) The extent to which the parent has maintained regular visitation or
other contact with the child; (3) The extent of payment by the parent for the cost of care
and maintenance of the child when financially able to do so including the time that the
child is in the custody of the division or other child-placing agency; (4) Whether
additional services would be likely to bring about lasting parental adjustment enabling
a return of the child to the parent within an ascertainable period of time; (5) The parent’s
disinterest in or lack of commitment to the child; (6) The conviction of the parent of a
felony offense that the court finds is of such a nature that the child will be deprived of a
stable home for a period of years; provided, however, that incarceration in and of itself
shall not be grounds for termination of parental rights; (7) Deliberate acts of the parent
or acts of another of which the parent knew or should have known that subjects the child
to a substantial risk of physical or mental harm.”).
95 In re C.A.M., 282 S.W.3d 398, 409 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
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unsafe shelter.” 96 The child’s siblings were removed from the
custody of the parent earlier and shortly thereafter the mother’s
parental rights in them were terminated. The mother had a history
of alcohol and chemical dependency, plus a record of mental health
issues. On more than one occasion, she attempted to commit
suicide, continued to resist rehabilitation services offered through
the state’s parenting plan, 97 and infrequently visited her son in
foster care. Eventually, following protracted litigation when the
child was six years old, the state filed a petition to terminate the
mother’s rights in the child. 98
The state trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights
in the boy because of harmful conditions adversely affecting her
child, resulting in the child being under the jurisdiction of the court
for more than a year. 99 Furthermore, there was little likelihood that
the conditions causing removal would improve sufficiently so that
the child might be integrated into a stable and permanent home. 100
On appeal, the appellate court concurred with the findings and the
holding of the trial court, concluding that “[m]other continues to
engage in unhealthy relationships and substance abuse; these
behaviors contribute to Mother’s lack of an ability to provide a
stable home for Child.” 101
After finding clear and convincing evidence supporting
termination, the appellate court discussed the second prong of
inquiry: whether it is in the best interest of the child to terminate
the parent’s rights. The court focused on the fact that the child
needed permanency, 102 noting that the child was in out-of-home
care for almost four years, more than half of the child’s life. 103 The
court concluded that “continuation of the parent-child relationship
greatly diminished Child’s prospects for early integration into a
stable and permanent home.” 104 This best interest inquiry

96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

In re I.G.P., 375 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 118–19.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 121–22.
Id. at 130.
In re I.G.P., 375 S.W.3d 112, 131 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 130.
Id.
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incorporated many of the statutory grounds for termination, but it
remains a subjective undertaking.
In another illustration, on June 26, 2000, a single mother with
three existing children gave birth to two additional children, twin
girls. 105 She was poor and now faced with the daunting prospect of
raising five children while trying to keep her job. She decided that
she would provide the twins with a “better life” by surrendering
them to adoptive parents, intending an open-adoption
arrangement. 106 After consulting with adoption professionals, she
opted for what is called an “open adoption,” which would allow her
to maintain contact with and provide support for the twins as they
grew toward maturity while living in another parent’s home. 107
Open adoption is one “in which the birth parents meet the adoptive
parents, participate in the separation and placement process,
relinquish all legal, moral and nurturing rights to the child, but
retain the right to continue contact and knowledge of child’s
whereabouts and welfare.” 108 Not every state permits open
adoptions and the mother’s state did not, so the mother sought to
place the twins with adoptive parents in California, in part because
that state permitted this. The mother visited the prospective
parents for ten days, but ultimately concluded that it was not a good
placement because the couple seemed reluctant to allow her access
to the twin girls after her surrender. 109
The mother then began a second search for suitable adoptive
parents. While still in California, she invited another couple to visit
her from Great Britain. The mother thought they would be ideal
parents so together they all traveled to Arkansas to complete the
adoption process, which the mother was advised was an
advantageous state for open adoption. 110 After the mother falsely

105 In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. 2004). But see Melissa Jonson-Reid, et al.,
Repeat Reports Among Cases Reported for Child Neglect: A Scoping Review, 92 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 43, 62 (2019) (“[S]ome studies indicate single parent families had
increased risk [of neglecting a child], many of those studies failed to [consider] other key
variables like family size, income or availability of . . . support.”).
106 In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 6.
107 Id.
108 E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY OF
ADOPTION 198–99 (1998).
109 In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 6.
110 Id.
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claimed Arkansas residency, an “Arkansas judge approved the
adoption,” 111 and the couple took the twins home to Great Britain.
Eventually, British officials determined that the couple was unfit,
and the twins were taken into custody and transferred back to
Missouri, where they were placed in the custody of the Missouri
Division of Family Services. 112 Upon discovering that the mother
was not a bona fide Arkansas resident, the Arkansas court set aside
the adoption decree for lack of jurisdiction. 113
When the mother discovered that the Arkansas adoption was
annulled and her children were placed in a nonrelative foster care
home, she at first thought that the Missouri foster parents with
whom the children were placed should be allowed to adopt them.
However, she quickly rejected this option and “strove to gain back
custody of the twins instead.” 114 She “resolved to rear the babies
herself and rally the support of her family so that she could do it
well.” 115 In spite of her efforts to regain custody of her children, the
Division of Family Services (“DFS”) resisted, alleging that the
mother committed severe and recurrent acts of emotional abuse
toward the twins, acts that they concluded would continue in the
future. 116 Specifically, DFS alleged that the mother placed the
children with strangers in California, Arkansas, and Great Britain
within the first few months of the children’s lives and that such
conduct would continue into the future. 117 The trial court agreed
with DFS, holding that the mother’s acts were sufficiently abusive
to constitute clear and convincing evidence supporting
termination. 118 Furthermore, the reasons for the mother’s conduct
had not dissipated, warranting concerns over the mother’s
recurrent behavior in the foreseeable future.
While the children were in state custody, consistent with state
procedures, Missouri offered the mother services within the
parameters of a parenting plan, intending that successful

111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 7–8.
In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Mo. 2004).
Id. at 12–13.
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completion of which may result in reunification. 119 The proposed
services required the mother to (1) take parenting classes, (2) visit
the children in their foster home regularly, (3) provide financial
support for the twins, (4) undergo a psychological examination, and
(5) submit to drug screening. 120 The mother complied with all of the
requirements of the parenting plan, but child protective services
nonetheless filed another petition to terminate the mother’s rights,
alleging that in spite of the mother’s cooperation with state
services, “conditions of a potentially harmful nature continue to
exist and will not be remedied at an early date . . . [for the twins’]
early integration into a stable and permanent home.” 121 The
continuing poverty of the mother is most likely the condition to
which child protective services refers.
Pertinent to the agency’s petition, the trial court found that,
(1) the mother’s conduct placed stress on the twins, resulting in
their experiencing Reactive Detachment Disorder in Partial
Remission, which is a mental disorder; (2) that the mother was
indecisive in providing for her children; (3) that there was an
absence of parent-child emotional ties; (4) that the mother to date
could not garner family support to assist with the health and
welfare of her twins; and (5) that the mother “is unwilling or unable
to provide ‘The Twins’ with the stability necessary for their overall
welfare.” 122 Based on these findings the trial court terminated the
mother’s parental rights, holding that there was clear and
convincing evidence of specific statutory grounds and furthermore,
that parental rights termination is in the best interest of the
child. 123

119 Id. Progress in complying with the terms of a parenting plan may result in a
court’s decision to postpone termination proceedings. Id. at 10. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 211.447.5(3)(a) (West 2021); In re T.A.L., 328 S.W.3d 238, 241 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010)
(mother’s parental rights not terminated because progress she made in cooperation with
plan).
120 In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 7. A parent’s drug use and resulting harm to the child
appear in many of the termination cases. See, e.g., In re M.L.R., 249 S.W.3d 864, 868–69
(Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
121 In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 8 (citing provisions of MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447.4(3)).
122 Id.
123 In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Mo. 2004). See MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447.6 (West
2021). See also MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447.7 (West 2021) (listing factors to establish what
is in the best interest of the child). Courts often address each factor in making a
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The mother appealed the termination order of the trial court
to the Missouri Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to the
Missouri Supreme Court prior to making a disposition itself
because “cases involving termination of parental rights and
adoption be given priority.” 124 The gist of the mother’s appeal was
that the trial court failed to make the necessary findings
sufficiently “linked to predict future behavior.” 125 In both the
majority and dissenting opinions, the Missouri Supreme Court
focused on the mother’s predictive behavior. Specifically, the
opinions addressed two questions: first, what is sufficient to meet
the statutory requirements for termination, 126 and second, what
level of proof is sufficient to predict that adverse behavior will
continue for the reasonably foreseeable (predictable) future. 127 The
majority opinion ruled in favor of the mother, rejecting termination
of her rights, because there was insufficient evidence that her past
conduct was predictive of future misconduct. 128
Similar questions were raised in another state’s judicial
opinion. The Supreme Court of Connecticut addressed the
termination of parental rights involving two children, one born in
2005 and one in 2006. 129 Both children were involuntarily removed
from the custody of their parents a few days after birth based on
allegations of predictive neglect, specifically that the children, if left
in the custody of their parents, would be “denied proper care and
attention physically, educationally, emotionally and morally.” 130
determination that termination is in best interest of any child. See, e.g., In re D.D.C., 351
S.W.3d 722, 733–34 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).
124 In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 5, n.3 (citing MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.001.1, MO. CONST.
art. V, § 10, and MO. SUP. CT. R. 83.01, 83.02).
125 Id. at 9–10, n.6 (citing 32 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Parental Rights § 6 (2003)
(“[I]t is inappropriate to terminate a parent’s parental rights on the basis of neglect that
happened in the remote past and no longer exists.”)).
126 MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447.4 (West 2021).
127 In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 20–21. The dissent focuses on the trial court’s
conclusion that because the mother demonstrated “time and again” her “inability to
make appropriate decisions” regarding the care of her children that this pattern of
behavior will change in the foreseeable future. Id. at 31 (Price, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 11.
129 See In re Joseph W., 46 A.3d 59 (Conn. 2012) (remanding to trial court to establish
appropriate standard of proof for determining neglect under the doctrine of predictive
neglect).
130 In re Joseph W., 79 A.3d 155, 159 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2013) (citing In re Joseph W.,
46 A.3d 59, 68 (Conn. 2012)).
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The mother had a long history of mental health issues, precipitating
dangerous parenting decisions; the father simply refused to take
responsibility for the care of his children. 131 In this Connecticut
case, despite providing the mother with psychiatric services, the
mother failed to avail herself of—or benefit from—said services.
Likewise, father repeatedly failed to recognize the mother’s mental
health issues and how they negatively impacted her ability to care
for their children, demonstrating an inability to care for the
children independent of the mother. 132
A lengthy judicial process ensued. In 2007, child protective
services petitioned to terminate the parents’ rights in both children
on the grounds that the parents failed to “rehabilitate,” and the
court granted the petition for termination in 2008. 133 The parents
appealed, and the state’s appellate court affirmed the decision of
the trial court, prompting the parents to appeal to the state’s
highest court to reverse. In 2011, the Connecticut Supreme Court
reversed the order of termination and remanded the case for a new
trial. 134 On remand, the trial court again ruled that the children
were neglected and likely to remain so and approved termination of
the parents’ rights. Upon appeal in 2012, however, the state’s
highest court reversed the trial court and remanded for yet another
hearing. 135 Finally, in 2013 a trial court again ordered termination
of parental rights. In a lengthy and detailed opinion, the trial court
held that the parents “failed to achieve such a degree of
rehabilitation as to encourage belief that within a reasonable period
they could resume roles as parents.” 136 It is not that services were
not offered. Rather, it is that both parents refused to acknowledge
any value and need for mental health treatment or, in mother’s
case, medical treatment. “The parents never accepted that the
recommended programs or treatment were worthwhile. They
131 For a description of the mother’s diagnosis, history of services provided, and the
father’s neglect, see id. at 163–220.
132 Id. at 222.
133 Id. at 160.
134 Id. (citing In re Joseph W., 21 A.3d 723, 735 (Conn. 2011)).
135 In re Joseph W., 46 A.3d 59, 59 (Conn. 2012) (holding that the potential risk of
neglect standard was an inappropriate standard of proof of predictive neglect and
holding it be replaced with a finding that remaining in a parent’s custody would more
likely than not be injurious to the well-being of the child).
136 In re Joseph W., 79 A.3d 155, 155 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2013).
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consistently refused to accept advice and suggestions regarding
their parenting skills and made no progress in addressing the child
protection concerns.” 137
Although the Missouri and the Connecticut decisions both
involve recurrent high-risk patterns—poverty, mental health
issues, poor parenting skills, substance abuse, and conduct
sufficient to meet the state’s definition of predictive neglect—there
are distinctive elements. In Missouri, the mother in In re K.A.W.,
unlike the Connecticut parents in In re Joseph W., cooperated with
state services offered under the state’s parenting plan within a
reasonable period of time and her twins were restored to her
custody. Both sets of parents exhibited conduct adverse to the best
interest of their children, both confronted termination of their
parental rights, and both argued that the proof was inadequate to
permit so extreme an outcome as termination. Yet what
distinguished the Missouri mother is that services provided to her
were apparently adequate and most importantly, she complied with
them, thereby demonstrating her awareness of the problem and her
complicity in working towards a future free from child neglect. Her
affliction was primarily poverty augmented with poor parenting
choices.
The Connecticut parents did not cooperate, thereby indicating
that neglect would continue into the predictive future. Their neglect
of their children resulted from mental health issues, poor parenting
skills undoubtedly learned from their own childhoods, and their
steadfast refusal to cooperate or be compliant with state
caseworkers. These cases are the most difficult, as is illustrated by
the lengthy judicial process prior to eventually terminating
parental rights. These cases challenge government officials to ask
what constitutes adequate remedial services. Are any services
adequate? Is compliance the key, though the underlying conditions
of poverty and/or mental health causing poor parenting skills
remain untreated? How may federal funding initiatives prompt
states to develop innovative remedial services that address these
factual issues?

137

Id. at 235.
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B. The Legal Context
Once a complaint is made to state authorities alleging the
neglect or abuse of a child, what often becomes a lengthy legal
process commences. Until recently, a verified complaint resulted in
the automatic temporary removal of the child from the parent’s
home. Today, even if the child is permitted to remain in the custody
of the parent or a relative, that parent is then entitled to a
statutorily required investigation and social study at least fifteen
days prior to a dispositional hearing. 138 Then, if the reported
adverse conditions are verified, the child becomes “dependent” and
a parenting plan is created. As a result of the 2018 Family First
legislation, children may remain, if feasible, with their parents or a
relative during which the parenting plan provides “mental health
and substance abuse prevention and treatment services, [and] inhome parent skill-based programs.” 139 The legislation fosters
programs such as Child First, which is a program that strengthens
the parent-child relationship and increases the social-emotional
well-being of both child and caregiver. In addition, clinical teams
promote self-regulation and executive function capacity by
mentoring caregivers on how to focus their attention, plan,
organize, and problem solve. 140 “The care coordinator works to
immediately stabilize the family and connects family members to
community-based services to decrease stressors and promote
healthy development, as identified in the plan of care.” 141
Parental conduct precipitating state intervention may
automatically warrant immediate termination of parental rights,
but most conduct is more nebulous. “Poor conduct or character
flaws are not relevant unless they could actually result in future
harm to the child.” 142 As observed by many courts, “[e]ven where
the parent-child relationship is ‘marginal,’ it is usually in the best
See, e.g., In re C.G., 212 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, § 50702, 132 Stat. 232 (2018).
For an array of services and programs recommended to the states, see CHILDREN’S
BUREAU, CAPACITY BUILDING CENTER FOR STATES, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
A DATA-DRIVEN APPROACH TO SERVICE ARRAY GUIDE (2019).
140 Child First, TITLE IV-E PREVENTION SERVICES: CLEARINGHOUSE (2021),
https://preventionservices.abtsites.com/programs/276/show
[https://perma.cc/KY5RXPDJ].
141 Id.
142 In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Mo. 2004).
138
139
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interests of the child to remain at home and still benefit from a
family environment.” 143 This perception that a child is better off at
home, even if the home is marginal, is grounded in the fundamental
right of a parent to the custody of his or her child. “The fundamental
liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they
have not been model parents . . . .” 144 Therefore, unless parental
conduct is clearly and convincingly severe, such as rape, incest, or
murder, the trial court must, prior to any termination order, ask if
the parent’s conduct is “severe enough to constitute abuse and
neglect and whether it provides an indication of the likelihood of
future harm to the [child].” 145 That is, “there must be a finding
connecting . . . harm to the child and clear, cogent and convincing
evidence to support it.” 146
If the parent’s conduct is sufficiently harmful, more than
marginal, the state must provide adequate and reasonable remedial
services, as well as a parenting plan to assist the parent in
correcting the misconduct. Failure to cooperate with these services
builds upon the misconduct itself and may be considered in any
subsequent petition to terminate parental rights based on
predictive recurrent behavior. The analysis includes “evidence
[that] supports the trial court’s conclusion that [a parent’s] failure
to acknowledge her role in failing to protect her children from
sexual abuse made reunification extremely unlikely in a manner
consistent with the children’s well-being.” 147 The parent’s past
misconduct, taken together with the parent’s ongoing failure to
cooperate with current state reunification efforts, permits a court
to conclude that neglect or abuse will continue into the foreseeable
future. Eventually, this analysis permits termination of parental
rights based on predictive recurrent behavior.
Past parental misconduct resulting in a child being termed a
dependent is the starting point, but only insofar as it provides
In re Juv. Appeal (83-CD), 455 A.2d 1313, 1319 (Conn. 1983).
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). See, e.g., In re S.M.H., 160 S.W.3d
355, 372 (Mo. 2005) (“[A]lthough Father may not be a model parent and has in the past
made some bad choices and exhibited some poor behaviors, he will be able to knowingly
provide S.M.H. the necessary care, custody, and control. This is all that is required.”).
145 In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 12.
146 In re K.M.A.-B., 493 S.W.3d 457, 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
147 J.S. v. Juv. Officer (In re J.S.), 477 S.W.3d 719, 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
143
144
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evidence predictive of future harm. To be convincing, at a
minimum, there must be some “explicit consideration of whether
the past acts provide an indication of . . . future harm.” 148 These
past acts must include not only ones prompting the state to name
the child a dependent, but progressing up to and until there may be
a subsequent petition submitted to terminate parental rights. 149
During this period, evidence of the parent’s willingness to cooperate
with state services may be gleaned from the level of cooperation
with the operative state parenting plan. 150 Undoubtedly, the
parent’s conduct throughout this period, both adverse behavior and
cooperation with the parenting plan, contributes to an assessment
of future recurrent abuse. Any assessment must establish a
continuum. “[A] trial court cannot support a termination by merely
incorporating earlier findings . . . .” 151
The sufficiency of the evidence is what lengthens the legal
process, especially when any state termination statute focuses on
future recurrent behavior. Two Missouri statutes are illustrative of
future recurrent harm to a child sufficient to result in termination:

148 In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Mo. 2004) (citing to In re L.G., 764 S.W.2d 89, 95
(Mo. 1989)).
149 Id. (citing to In re T.A.S., 32 S.W.3d 804, 812 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)).
150 See, e.g., In re B.C.K., 103 S.W.3d 319, 328–29 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (The manner
in which the parent cooperates with the parenting plan will indicate the parent’s future
efforts to care for the child).
151 In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 10.
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The child has been under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
for a period of one year, and the court finds that the conditions
which led to the assumption of jurisdiction still persist, or
conditions of a potentially harmful nature continue to exist,
that there is little likelihood that those conditions will be
remedied at an early date so that the child can be returned to
the parent in the near future, or the continuation of the parentchild relationship greatly diminishes the child’s prospects for
early integration into a stable and permanent home. 152
***
The parent is unfit to be a party to the parent and child
relationship because of a consistent pattern of committing a
specific abuse including, but not limited to, specific conditions
directly relating to the parent and child relationship which are
determined by the court to be of a duration or nature that
renders the parent unable for the reasonably foreseeable future
to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or
emotional needs of the child. 153

The lengthy legal process is compounded by the fact that the
Constitution of the United States does not require the appointment
of counsel for indigent parents in civil termination proceedings. 154
Terminating parental rights, though, requires at least clear and
convincing evidence, commensurate with the fundamental right of
a parent to the custody of that parent’s child. 155 Often, parents
stumble through the legal maze, which contributes to the lack of
sufficient evidence to terminate parental rights. The Missouri
Supreme Court formulates the clear and convincing test as
whenever the existing evidence “instantly tilts the scales in favor of
termination when weighed against the evidence in opposition and

MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447.5(3) (West 2021) (emphasis added).
Id. § 211.447.5(5)(a) (emphasis added).
154 See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31–32 (1981). However, states
must afford the parents Due Process protections. Id. at 33–34. See generally Patricia C.
Kussmann, Annotation, Right of Indigent Parent to Appointed Counsel in Proceeding for
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 92 A.L.R. 5th 379 (2001) (analyzing
collected cases regarding a court’s appointment of counsel in a parental rights
termination proceeding).
155 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982).
152
153

138

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 92:1

the finder of fact is left with the abiding conviction that the evidence
is true.” 156
The process is further compounded by the reality that parents
confronting termination are most often “poor, uneducated, or
members of minority groups [and thus] often vulnerable to
judgements based on cultural or class bias.” 157 Seeking to minimize
unwarranted conjecture, often fueled by cultural bias, courts
require recorded factual conclusions detailing clear and convincing
evidence that the alleged conduct was of such a nature to warrant
predictive concerns. 158 Failure to adequately record sufficient
evidence was the basis on which the In re K.A.W. majority reversed
the trial court’s order of termination. 159 The state’s highest court’s
majority opinion did not agree or disagree with the trial judge’s
conclusion. Rather, it relied upon the lack of a complete factual
recording of the facts upon which the termination order was based.
Included within this evidence must be concrete instances of alleged
parental misconduct, recorded as severe enough to harm the child,
a chronological record of the mother’s post-removal conduct, and a
specific description as to why the trial court concluded the mother’s
conduct was indicative of predictive recurrent abuse. Sufficiency of
the evidence is indicated in the court’s admonition that “the abuse
must be of such a duration and nature that the trial court
determines that the parent will not remedy the problem and so it
renders the parent unfit for the reasonably foreseeable future.” 160
The In re K.A.W. decision is illustrative of what is often a
lingering legal process. The Missouri trial court held that by placing
the children in multiple placements immediately after their birth
in 2000, the mother’s conduct constituted “severe and recurrent
acts of emotional abuse.” 161 Later, however, the appellate court
reversed, holding that the trial court did not provide sufficient
In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. 2004).
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763.
158 See In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 15. The appellate court held the trial court did not
clearly and convincingly established proof of a lack of family support, or that the children
suffered from a major mental disorder, or that there was no bonding between the
children and their mother. Id. at 14–16.
159 Id. at 21.
160 Id. at 20 (citing In re P.C., 62 S.W.3d 600, 606 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)).
161 Id. at 13. Additional acts of abuse are cited by the dissent, all derived from the
facts discovered by the trial court. Id. at 23–30 (William, J., dissenting).
156
157

2022]

CHILD WELFARE REMEDIAL SERVICES

139

evidence of harm to the children, or that the mother’s conduct
towards her children when placed in foster care was sufficient to
indicate a likelihood of predictive recurrent harm to the children if
they were returned to her custody. Sufficiency—its presence or lack
thereof—is garnered from the parent’s compliance with the legal
process, rather than with adequate remedial services. The factual
and legal process took four years from the time of the children’s
birth in 2000 to the final ruling in favor of their mother in 2004.
Similarly, in the Connecticut decision of In re Joseph, the
dependent child was born in 2005 but litigation pertaining to
termination of the parents’ rights did not cease until 2013. 162
Throughout this eight-year period, the legal process evolved from
removal of the child from the parents when he was three days old
to petitions for termination of parental rights, court-ordered
termination, and appeals. 163 In finally affirming the order of
termination of parental rights, the Connecticut Superior Court
opined that, “[t]hese two little boys have remained in the limbo of
foster care all of their lives, about one-third of their childhoods.
Their need for stability and continuity of care far outweighs the
extremely questionable benefit of resuming a connection to two
recalcitrant parents they no longer know.” 164
The cost of the legal process, the emotional toll taken on all
participants, and the vagaries of litigation are inadequate remedies
sufficient to protect child welfare. It is far more reasonable, fair,
and productive to promote state efforts to provide innovative
remedial services that may incrementally prove adequate.

III. PARENTING PLANS
A. The Process
Severe parental misconduct is necessary to remove a child
from the custody of that child’s parents for more than a brief period

See In re Joseph W., 79 A.3d 155, 157 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2013).
Id. at 159–62.
164 Id. at 256 (considering the Connecticut Supreme Court has noted that “time is of
the essence” given the “psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on
young children”).
162
163
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of time. 165 Only a small proportion of misconduct is sufficient to
then terminate parental rights. 166 Once in state custody, the child
becomes a “dependent” and is placed temporarily in either kinship
care (with a relative) or state foster care (close to 400,000 children
are in foster care). 167 Parents are then offered “such services as the
State deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the child’s
home.” 168 For example, when a parent’s children were removed
from the parent’s custody because of credible allegations of sexual
abuse, the state provided “numerous services to [the parent] over a
span of several years, including Intensive In–Home Services, a
safety plan regarding the supervision of the children, referrals to
individual therapy for [the parent] and the children, a parent aid,
and contact with the children as therapeutically recommended.” 169
These services, and similar ones, are offered by state agencies to
rectify the conditions causing the removal of the child.
165 See, e.g., In re Juv. Appeal (83-CD), 455 A.2d 1313, 1315–16 (Conn. 1983) (holding
that a child may be temporarily removed from the parent’s custody for a period of 96
hours if there is probable cause). As the party “seeking a change in custody,” the state
“must prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that custody should be taken from
the parent and vested in the commissioner on a temporary basis.” Id. at 1323.
166 See, e.g., In re B.C.K., 103 S.W.3d 319, 328 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that
mother’s misconduct did not meet the level of clear and convincing evidence necessary to
terminate parental rights).
167 About
the Children, ADOPTUSKIDS, https://www.adoptuskids.org/meet-thechildren/children-in-foster-care/about-thechildren#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20most%20recent,care%20in%20the%20Unit
ed%20States.&text=More%20than%20half%20of%20the,many%20by%20their%20foste
r%20parents [https://perma.cc/VYX3-PJW2] (last visited Feb. 20, 2022). For an excellent
description of the distinction between kinship care and foster care, see Josh GuptaKagan, America’s Hidden Foster Care System, 72 STAN. L. REV. 841 (2020).
168 Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. § 675(E)(iii) (1997).
169 In re J.S. v. Juv. Officer, 477 S.W.3d 719, 725 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). See also In re
I.G.P., 375 S.W.3d 112, 125 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (state services consisted of “in-home
services, family-centered services, dual-diagnosis residential treatment, inpatient
substance abuse treatment, outpatient substance abuse treatment, individual therapy,
medication management, the “Parents as Teachers” program, weekly visitation,
supervised visitation, transportation to visits, AA/NA meetings, random drug testing,
psychological evaluation, and parenting assessments”); In re J.D.P., 406 S.W.3d 81, 82
(Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (state services required “(1) the obtainment and maintenance of
financial stability or regular employment; (2) the obtainment and maintenance of
appropriate housing; (3) submission to drug testing; (4) enrollment in and successful
completion of an approved substance abuse assessment; (5) attendance at no less than
two meetings per week of a twelve-step program; (6) enrollment in and successful
completion of parenting skills training; (7) submission to psychological and parenting
evaluations; and (8) visitation with [the child] at mutually convenient times”).
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Parental cooperation with state rehabilitative services may
establish that there is “little likelihood that [the conduct] will be
remedied at an early date so that the child can be returned to the
parent” or that “the continuation of the parent-child relationship
greatly diminishes the child’s prospect for early integration into a
stable and permanent home.” 170 Likewise, “[t]he inability to follow
through or make progress in meeting the terms of the plan is
indicative of [a parent’s] current and future inability to care for
[the] [c]hild.” 171 The rehabilitative period during which services are
rendered is significant in predicting whether or not there will be
adverse recurrent behavior. At a minimum, “a parent’s efforts to
comply with a treatment plan is highly relevant to predicting future
behavior.” 172
Irrefutably, parental cooperation with state parenting plans is
part of a continuum of conduct sufficiently predictive of future
events. “Isolated abusive acts or conditions may not support
termination when considered individually, but if they form a
consistent pattern, are recurrent or are repeated, they can, when
considered in combination, rise to the level of abuse and support
termination.” 173 Illustrative of a parent’s inability or refusal to
cooperate with state reunification efforts is the following factual
scenario:

MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.47.5(3) (West 2021).
In re I.G.P., 375 S.W.3d 112, 125 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). For an illustration of services
offered and the parent’s failure to cooperate with the services, see In re L.J.D., 352
S.W.3d 658, 672–74 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).
172 In re Q.A.H., 426 S.W.3d 7, 15 (Mo. 2014) (parent remained in sexually violent
relationship and refused to act on recommendations made by psychiatrists).
173 In re S.R.H., 589 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019).
170
171
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Mother has not cooperated in receiving offered services.
Mother has failed to follow up on community service referrals.
Mother has gone for consistent periods of time without being
under a psychiatrist’s care, over a year during this case, and
has not consistently taken her medication. Mother never
provided contact information for a health provider that she was
seeing or medications she was taking during that time. [Social
worker] noted that for a period of at least nine months during
the case, Mother did not participate in individual counseling.
Mother was given referrals for housing but there was a
significant period of time during this case that she was either
homeless or was not notifying the Children’s Division where
she was residing. She was provided opportunities for visitation
with Daughter. However, there was a significant period of time
where Mother either did not call to confirm a visit, did not show
up for visits, or left no contact information to arrange visits. 174

The primary test for any parenting plan is to demonstrate
“whether the lack of compliance in any regard demonstrates that a
dangerous condition has been left uncorrected and will not be
remedied in the near future.” 175 Regardless, whether the child is
removed or remains with the parent after a credible allegation of
abuse or neglect, and prior to an order terminating parental rights,
a court must make written findings regarding the timeliness,
nature, and extent of services offered to the parent and the child. 176
Again, the goal of any parenting plan is to indicate whether adverse
parental conduct will affect the child in the future. 177
All too often, the focus is not on rectifying the adverse conduct
reported, but on the parent’s obedience in complying with the plan.
Instead, in evaluating parenting plan compliance the focus must be
upon the adverse conduct itself, the treatment plan’s effectiveness
in treatment, and then upon the parent’s cooperation to lessen the
likelihood of “the presence of a harmful condition presently or in the
future.” 178 In other words, has the parent demonstrated progress in
In re S.M.F., 393 S.W.3d 635, 640 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
In re S.R.H., 589 S.W.3d at 72.
176 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-112(k) (West 2019).
177 See, e.g., In re M.T.E.H., 468 S.W.3d 383, 398 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that
parent’s conduct during the termination trial contributed to termination as being in the
best interest of the child).
178 In re K.M.A.-B., 493 S.W.3d 457, 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
174
175
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addressing alcohol or drug abuse, violence, gainful employment, or
the presence in the home of dangerous companions? Throughout the
evaluation, focus should be upon whether a parent willingly
cooperates to “adequately address . . . substance abuse and mental
health issues,” exhibits a willingness to “participate in a long-term
residential
substance
abuse
treatment
program,”
and
“demonstrated . . . commitment” to themselves and the child,
thereby reducing “a substantial risk of physical and mental harm if
the relationship continued.” 179 In this regard, a “[m]other’s lack of
effort to comply and her ultimate failure to succeed in her treatment
plan are ‘highly relevant evidence’ for predicting her future
parental behavior and ‘cannot be irrelevant.’” 180 Behavior must be
evaluated in accordance with treatment of the adverse behavior,
not on the parent’s cooperation with the caseworker.
The danger of an improper focus on obedience rather than
treatment is illustrated in the In re C.A.L. decision. 181 The facts
involved a single parent who gave birth to her third child. The
parent took the child home after birth but soon after, the child was
hospitalized for pneumonia and severe loss of weight. Notified by
hospital authorities, the child’s condition prompted the state to take
temporary custody of the child because the child appeared to be
“failing to thrive” in the parent’s care. 182 The child was placed in
foster care in 2001 and remained there while mother was ordered
to comply with state services, the parenting plan. 183 The mother
consistently failed to cooperate with the provisions of the parenting
plan and the trial court heard testimony up to and including 2005.
Undoubtedly, the parent was not obedient. Throughout nearly four
years, the child remained in the same foster care placement. The
parent’s disobedience was noted by the trial court, in that the
In re I.G.P., 375 S.W.3d 112, 132 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
In re G.C., 443 S.W.3d 738, 748 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014).
181 228 S.W.3d 66, 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
182 Id. at 69.
183 Id. at 69–70 (parent’s treatment plan specified as: “[1] provide and maintain a
stable place of residence; [2] inform the Children’s Division of any changes in address
and household composition; [3] sign releases of information forms; [4] [visit child
protection agency] a minimum of two times per month; [5] be gainfully employed or have
lawful means of steady income; [6] attend parenting classes; [7] cooperate in obtaining a
psychological evaluation and follow any recommendations; [8] attend and participate in
individual and/or family counseling as recommended by the Children’s Division; and [9]
attend and participate in all scheduled medical appointments”).
179
180
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parent “was not following the treatment plan as prescribed by the
Children’s Division, and had gotten into verbal and physical
altercations with a worker.” 184 Eventually, the state submitted a
petition to terminated the parent’s rights due to “the length of time
and the bonding the child has with the foster parents, and the
length of time the child has not been with the mother.” 185 The trial
court held that the mother’s parental rights should be terminated.
On appeal, the appellate court overturned the trial court’s
termination decision. Overall, the appellate court rejected the focus
of the trial court, which was upon the “[m]other’s general lack of
cooperation with the Children’s Division.” 186 Instead, on appeal the
court focused on the mother’s “improvement” 187 and the fact that
the mother “exhibited a real concern” for the child. 188 The court
concluded that while it is true that the child has been in foster care
for four years, “this finding is not relevant in supporting grounds
for termination. This finding is only appropriate if we reach the best
interest analysis.” 189 Cooperation with authority versus progress
with services offered is the choice, the trial court opted for the
former and the appellate court the latter.
The decision offers an insight into the significance of parental
cooperation with state authorities. If focus centers on cooperation
with the state agency, there may be a different outcome than if
focus is on treatment of the parent’s condition. In this case, there
was severe antagonism between the agency and the parent and one
of the consequences of this was that the child remained outside of
the parent’s custody for a significant period of time. During this
time, the child bonded with the foster parents and they with the
child. This bonding precipitated the agency’s conclusion that the
best interest of the child is served by keeping the child with the
foster parents. 190 However, such a conclusion is impermissible.
Because of the parent’s Due Process rights, the best interest of the
child is presumed to be in the custody of the parent and must be

184
185
186
187
188
189
190

Id. at 68.
Id. at 68–69.
Id. at 74.
In re C.A.L., 228 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 76.
Id. at 75.
Id.
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rebutted to reach a best interest of the child analysis. 191 It is
constitutionally impermissible to begin any child custody
determination involving a non-parent by starting with what is in
the best interest of the child. In this case, the focus of the agency
was upon obedience, which resulted in the child remaining with the
foster parents. If the focus is instead upon progress with treatment
of the adverse condition, the parent’s failure to rectify the adverse
condition may occasion a best interest analysis and possible
termination.

B. Adequate Services
Cooperation with adequate state rehabilitative services is
pivotal when refuting the dependency of a child. In some cases, the
state is not obligated to provide reunification services when there
is clear and convincing evidence of severe adverse parental
conduct. 192 In addition, states need only provide what is adequate
or reasonable under the circumstances, not everything possible. 193
Throughout the rehabilitative process, the “goal of offering
prevention services is to reduce the number of children and youth
entering or reentering foster care.” 194 This goal may be attained
through preventative services, designed to prevent any misconduct,
or through remedial services, which seek to correct the adverse
behavior.

1. Constitutive Services
Parenting plans proposed by states may include extensive
preventative and remedial services such as psychiatric care,
nutrition counseling, anger management classes, employment

See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000).
See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(b) (West 2022) (listing seventeen
instances, such as incest or rape, when services are not provided).
193 See, e.g., In re Unique R., 156 A.3d 1, 13 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017); Watley v. Dep’t of
Child. & Fams., 991 F.3d 418, 427 (2d Cir. 2021) (a determination of a state’s highest
court that reasonable services were offered to parents is entitled to Full Faith and
Credit).
194 ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, FAMILY FIRST PREVENTION SERVICES ACT FISCAL
ANALYSIS: GUIDE AND TOOLS 2 (2020), https://assets.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecffamilyfirstfiscalanalysis-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HF9-4PQ6].
191
192
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services, and drug/alcohol cessation services. 195 At its 2019
legislative summit, the National Conference of State Legislatures
discussed an array of suggested federal prevention services and
corresponding level of review, including: (1) Parent-Child
Interaction Therapy (well supported), (2) Trauma FocusedCognitive Behavioral Therapy (promising), (3) Multisystemic
Therapy (well supported), (4) Functional Family Therapy (well
supported), (5) Substance Abuse Treatment (well supported), (6)
Multisystemic Therapy for Child Abuse and Neglect (no data), (7)
Families Facing the Future (supported), (8) Methadone
Maintenance Therapy (promising), (9) Parenting Intensive Skill
Building (well supported), (10) Healthy Families America (well
supported), and (11) Parents as Teachers (well supported). 196 Also,
the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data Systems (“NCANDS”)
collects data on 26 types of services, funded through federal
programs like the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
(“CAPTA”), the Community-Based Child Abuse Prevention Grants,
the Promoting Safe and Stable Families, or the Social Services
Block Grants (SSBG).
In general, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Children’s Bureau, classifies services as either preventive
or postresponsive. 197 Section 1130 of the Social Security Act
authorizes the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to
grant waivers to states so that they may support and implement
alternative child welfare services that seem promising. 198
Illustrative of the success of these programs is Arkansas’
Differential Response, which resulted in significantly fewer
instances of recidivism or removal of the child from the parent’s
home. 199 Likewise, families participating in a New York program
195 See, e.g., In re A.L.M., 354 S.W.3d 645, 648–50 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (describing an
array of sponsored services). See also TITLE IV-E PREVENTION SERVICES
CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://preventionservices.abtsites.com/program
[https://perma.cc/8R6M-RJDG], which lists rated services.
196 National Conference of State Legislatures, 2019 Legislative Summit 26 (2019),
https://www.ncsl.org/meetings-training/legislative-summit-19/schedule/agenda.aspx
[https://perma.cc/2NN3-GJ2D].
197 CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019, supra note 3, at 77. During 2019, 1.9 million children
received prevention services and 1.3 million children received post response services. Id.
at xii.
198 See GRAHAM, supra note 76, at 4.
199 Id. at 26.
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designed to lower caseloads resulted in a “statistically significant
positive effect on permanency outcomes.” 200 Although “foster care
maintenance and administrative costs will likely remain the largest
category of Title IV-E expenditures for some time,” 201 the success of
waiver programs demonstrates that more adequate child welfare
services can be developed. “[W]aivers made possible a substantial
expansion of the range of programs and services implement by child
welfare jurisdictions at both the state and local levels.” 202 Of course,
the dilemma is that these nascent programs do not initially meet
the rating requirements imposed by federal legislation, such as
being well-supported. As Family First illustrates, this negatively
impacts funding.
The significance of Family First is not that Title IV-E funds
may be used while children remain in their homes rather than in
foster care, but whether more states will develop innovative
remedial services to support in-home child welfare. 203 Child welfare
innovation—not in-home placement—is the challenge of Family
First. Colorado, for example, spent $9.7 million in 2019 state
appropriations to extend programs initiated through waivers. 204
Across the board, we know what works from analyzing data
gathered from other certified programs and waivers granted to
states since 1995. Specifically, we know these programs work: (1)
“active efforts by caseworkers to engage service providers and
families,” thereby increasing “their involvement in case planning
and decision-making”; (2) use of data to support case planning; (3)
use of support teams to facilitate service coordination and
communications; (4) timely access to support; (5) community-based
prevention programs; (6) statewide common intervention strategy
for domestic violence, family group intervention, and family
support services; (7) attentiveness to vulnerability of children and
adults; (8) continuous research and web-based tutorials; and (9)
using well-trained, friendly, knowledgeable, understanding, and
nonjudgmental caseworkers and front-line service providers. 205
Id. at 35.
Id. at 44.
202 Id. See e.g., COLORADO FAMILY FIRST, supra note 22, at 4–5 (discussing Colorado’s
Title IV-E Waiver Demonstration Project).
203 GRAHAM, supra note 76, at 44-45.
204 COLORADO FAMILY FIRST, supra note 22, at 4.
205 GRAHAM, supra note 76, at 21.
200
201
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2. State Resources
Services to promote child welfare are not restricted to Title IVE funding; there are additional state and federal prevention and
postresponse programs. 206 In addition, states utilize community
based organizations, such as Colorado’s Collaborative Management
Program, 207 which utilizes many segments of community support to
address treatment of domestic violence, drug and alcohol abuse,
mental health issues, and perennial court involvement; Colorado’s
Partnership for Thriving Families is working with housing experts
to address “housing security” for families at risk. 208 Even a casual
survey of services offered to parents and children reveals a broad
array of services available to those who know how to access them.
During 2019, 1.9 million children received prevention services,
while 1.3 million children received post responsive services. 209
By the middle of 2021, three years after the passage of Family
First, and approaching the end of Family First Transition Act
applicability, fewer than half of the states have obtained “approved”
Title IV-E plans fully in accord with Family First requirements. 210
A few of these approved states, Kentucky for example, touted that
it was a leader in its implementation. 211 Other states, such as
Virginia, which submitted a plan for approval, illustrate the
206 See, e.g., Title I of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) 42
U.S.C.A. § 5106(a) (West 2019) (provides grants to states to fund programs for prenatal
drug exposure, training child protective services workers, and supporting citizen review
panels). See also Title IV-B, Subpart 2, Promoting Safe and Stable Families (PSSF), 42
U.S.C.A. § 629 (West 2018) (provides grants to states to render services that address
family support in efforts to provide permanency for children); Title XX of the Social
Security Act, Social Services Block Grants (SSBG), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1397(a)-(i) (West 2010)
(provides grants to states to fund social services to reduce dependency and help
individuals who are unable to care for themselves to remain at home or find a suitable
institution).
207 See COLORADO FAMILY FIRST, supra note 22, at 5–6.
208 Id. at 6.
209 CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019, supra note 3, at xii (2021).
210 See Status of Submitted Title IV-E Prevention Program Five-Year Plans,
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (Feb.
18,
2020),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/data/status-submitted-title-iv-e-preventionprogram-five-year-plans [https://perma.cc/N9K3-TL9T].
211 See Kentucky Joins Jurisdictions Leading Implementation of the Family First
Prevention Services Act, CHAPIN HALL AT THE UNIV. OF CHICAGO (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://www.chapinhall.org/news/kentucky-joins-jurisdictions-leading-implementationof-the-family-first-prevention-services-act/ [https://perma.cc/K4HL-7ZF3].
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difficulty states confront when seeking approval. First, local
government and private agencies contracting with the state must
review existing services to determine if they can comply with
Family First’s exacting standards. 212 Second, each state must
spend its own money to acquire approval. For example, in Virginia
the Governor included several million dollars in his state budget
proposal to pay for prevention services yet to be approved by the
federal clearinghouse, plus to pay for a state evaluation team to
assess outcomes for provided services. The governor’s budget
included $18 million to increase salaries for caseworkers from a
current starting salary of $28,828. 213 Sadly, the entry-level
caseworker positions have an average turnover rate of 42%, with
higher turnover rates in rural parts of the state and it is hoped that
higher salaries may foster retention. 214 Note too, though, that these
same caseworkers complain about outdated training and poor case
management systems. In response, the state appropriated $1.9
million over the course of two years to create and implement a new
training academy. However, state budgets were impacted by the
Coronavirus pandemic, which prompted hiring freezes and an
increasing number of vacant positions. 215 Overall, states are
“subject to available general fund appropriations” to supplement
whatever they receive from the federal subsidies, or to qualify for
federal subsidies. 216
Arkansas is another example of how states must spend money
to get money. When Arkansas submitted its draft Title IV-E
prevention program, which was subsequently approved, its draft
proposal illustrated the issues confronted by states seeking to
manage better child welfare. 217 First, state expenditures are
required to meet its goals, specifically hiring of needed
administrators and additional caseworkers to lessen caseloads and
L’Herrou et al., supra note 78, at 160.
Id. at 161.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 162.
216 21 FRANK K. MCGUANE & KATHLEEN A. HOGAN, COLORADO FAMILY LAW AND
PRACTICE HANDBOOK § 19-1-102(1.9) (2020-2021 ed.).
217 Arkansas Title IV-E Prevention Program Five Year Plan: 2020-2024, FAMILY FIRST
ACT,
3–4
(Aug.
2019),
https://familyfirstact.org/sites/default/files/AR%27s%20Five%20Year%20Title%20IVE%20Prevention%20Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X3U-VDWA].
212
213
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better interaction with parents. The need for better salaries, lower
turnover for caseworkers, and better training is a common element
throughout all the states. 218 Second, Arkansas, for example,
developed innovative programs, such as Team Decision Making,
Baby and Me, Intensive Home Services, SafeCare, and Nurturing
the Families of Arkansas. 219 Because of the high number of infant
deaths in the state, the state launched a program for pregnant
women called Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women,
Infants, and Children, which is designed to introduce mothers to
scheduling, stress relief, baby crying, and home safety. 220 In
addition, they pursued waiver requests to receive federal funds for
programs that they considered promising but not yet approved
under federal guidelines. 221 All of these programs required the state
to expend its own resources and assign personnel to management.
Third, throughout the states, the most common risk factors are
both perennial and seem insurmountable. Domestic violence and
drug abuse are the most prevalent factors, 222 but alcohol is also a
risk factor, as is physical or mental disability. Poverty, defined as
the inability to provide sufficient minimum needs such as housing
or food assistance, accompanies most risk factors. Recall the
poverty of the single mother illustrated in the Missouri case
discussed supra, In re K.A.W. 223 The mother was single with three
existing children and then she gave birth to twins. Her inability to
provide for herself and five children prompted her actions and
eventually her involuntary separation from her two most recent
children. The state provided her with a parenting plan and
subsequently documented: (1) the mother’s progress in compliance;
(2) the success or failure of state agencies tasked with providing her
aid; (3) evidence of the parent’s mental ability necessary to provide
the child with care, custody and control; 224 and (4) whether the
218 See, e.g., id. at 30–32 (emphasizing the importance of well-supported caseworkers
in improving the success of the child welfare system by increasing caseworker retention).
219 Id. at 4–5.
220 Id. at 4.
221 Id. at 28.
222 CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019, supra note 3, at 23 (2021).
223 See supra notes 105–28 and accompanying text.
224 For the standard of mental deficiency, see In re T.L.B., 376 S.W.3d 1, 11-12 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2011) (specifying that the condition must be documented with sufficient
evidence that there is no reasonable likelihood that condition will improve, and the
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parent can overcome any chemical dependency that prevents the
parent from providing care for the child. 225 Did any of these
compliance tests adequately address the true cause of the mother’s
adverse conduct, poverty of the family? Other than return to the
halcyon days of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 226 how
may a state incorporate the reality of earning income into a single
parent raising five children?
The issue is how to provide services sufficient to address the
most common forms of child welfare risk. “It remains unclear how
one would select the correct program for a given population . . . . A
mismatch between the program and the population at risk or the
resources available for implementation, may result in null or even
negative outcomes.” 227 Implicitly, studies suggest that child
mistreatment is a complex long-term “issue rather than an acute
and simple event,” 228 implying that identified family needs are not
being met in an appropriate fashion. 229 Also, “[r]isk factors can be
difficult to accurately assess and measure, and therefore may go
undetected among many children and caregivers.” 230 Faced with
insurmountable complexity, state agencies gauge success by
inappropriate standards of compliance, or obedience, rather than
truly rectifying the conditions causing removal of the child. 231
For example, the mother in In re K.A.W. was the victim of
poverty, while the mother in In re Joseph W. was afflicted with
mental health issues; the father failed to safely parent the children,
and both parents failed to comply with the state parenting plan
offered to them to correct these deficiencies. 232 The mother in the
condition renders the parent unable to knowingly provide child with care, comfort, and
control).
225 MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447.5(2)(b) (West 2021). See, e.g., In re S.T.C., 165 S.W.3d
505 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that there was insufficient evidence to terminate
parental rights of mother with chemical dependency problem).
226 For a description of the program, see Susan W. Blank & Barbara B. Blum, A Brief
History of Work Expectations for Welfare Mothers, 7 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 28 (1997).
227 Jonson-Reid, et al., supra note 105, at 63.
228 Kim & Drake, supra note 33, at 1182.
229 David Solomon et al., Cumulative Risk Hypothesis: Predicting and Preventing
Child Maltreatment Recidivism, 58 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 80, 86–87 (2016)
(suggesting that to prevent incident recurrence, states need to provide additional
services and involvement for longer periods of time).
230 CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019, supra note 3, at 23.
231 See supra notes 172–88 and accompanying text.
232 In re Joseph W., 79 A.3d 155, 233 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2016).
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former case, In re K.A.W., successfully obtained the return of her
children, while the parents in the later case, In re Joseph W., did
not. Why? A notable distinction between the two cases is that the
mother in the former case was compliant. The trial court
acknowledges that the “[m]other has been exceptionally compliant
with the parenting or social service plan.” 233 The two parents in the
latter case were not compliant. They consistently demonstrated
that they were “unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification
efforts,” 234 hence their parental rights were terminated. Obedience
to state agencies is an easier test to evaluate, the harder test is
evaluating the progress made by the services offered to correct the
adverse behavior.
It is reasonable to conclude that—faced with state budget
realities; overwhelming instances of abuse and neglect; and a
continuing spectrum of domestic violence, substance abuse, mental
illness, and the consequences of poverty—state caseworkers and
courts should focus on a parent’s compliance with what is offered,
rather than what best works for the reunification of parent and
child. If compliance/obedience is the default test, it is reasonable to
conclude that parents so often victimized by stereotypes and
conjecture—that is, parents of color—will be further stigmatized by
the quandaries surrounding predictive neglect determinations,
negative stereotype casting, and the most adverse consequences of
state budget difficulties.

CONCLUSION
The Family First Prevention Services Act of 2018 is
advantageous to promoting child welfare in that it makes federal
funds available to states while the child remains safely with
parents or family, eliminates the AFDC lookback requirement
when this occurs, and further incentivizes states to explore
adequate remedial services to better assure child welfare. All are
welcome advantages, but first, the focus of federal support must be

In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Mo. 2004).
In re Joseph W., 79 A.3d at 232. See also State v. Jalexus S. (In re A’Mauri L.), No.
A-1-CA-37966, 2020 WL 3970209, at *2 (N.M. Ct. App. Jul. 9, 2020) (mother missed
seven out of sixteen scheduled sessions).
233
234
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to develop more adequate remedial services to address the
insatiable ravages of abuse and neglect factors such as poverty,
domestic violence, mental illness, and substance abuse. Since the
1990s, Section 1130 of the Social Security Act has permitted states
and tribal jurisdictions to apply for Title IV-E waivers to garner
federal funds so as to discover new services to promote safety,
permanency, and well-being of children. “A variety of
demonstrations were implemented by 23 jurisdictions between
1996 and 2006, and by 27 jurisdictions between 2012 and 2019.” 235
Second, adequate remedial services must incentivize workers
of “multiple stakeholders” to contribute to a “long game” approach
to child welfare. 236 That is, such services must coordinate
community involvement in identifying vulnerable families, marshal
early domestic violence intervention, support greater decision
making in families, recognize that congregate care is essential to
meet individual needs, and better coordinate access to family
services. If Family First incentivizes states to recruit, train, and
support professional caseworkers, it will make a major difference.
The large percentage of caseworkers who depart from community
services after brief service is the first place to start to create
adequate community involvement.
Third, Family First is not truly preventative because its
provisions do not become applicable until there is imminent risk of
harm to a child. However, its enactment underscores the need for
more inclusive, better coordinated, and adequately funded
community-based preventative services. This is particularly crucial
to communities of color, inordinately represented among the
3,476,000 children who received child protective services
investigations in 2019. These parents may benefit most from
Family First’s payment for services to treat mental health,
substance abuse, and development of parenting skills, but more is
needed. Overall, the impact of Family First upon adequate child
welfare services may be that it motivates states to provide more
services that are truly preventative, to eliminate the lookback
GRAHAM, supra note 76, at 1.
Children’s Defense Fund, Implementing the Family First Prevention Services Act:
A Technical Guide for Agencies, Policymakers, and Other Stakeholders, 5 (Feb. 18 2020),
https://www.childrensdefense.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/FFPSA-Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D4MS-8C2G].
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entitlement requirement for all children at risk, to recognize the
contribution of a significant portion of congregate care facilities,
and to incentivize states to develop a better array of adequate
remedial services.

